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1 Introduction 
A basic tenet and component of most economics models is that individuals have stable and exog-
enous preferences. In problems of decision making under risk, models often rely upon individu-
als’ preferences exhibiting risk aversion; which implies utility functions are concave in an ex-
pected utility framework. Increasingly researchers have identified a wide class of risky decisions 
in which behavior is driven by individuals’ preferences exhibiting prudence (Kimball, 1990); 
which implies that marginal utility functions are concave in an expected utility framework.1 We 
turn our attention to when and how these two key traits – risk aversion and prudence – emerge 
and are shaped in children and adolescents. We do this by experimentally testing for the presence 
of these traits in 362 Chinese children and adolescents aged 8 to 17 years and then examining the 
correlation of these results with same tests for their parents – collected as hypotheticals in a sur-
vey – as well as with cognitive abilities and household attributes. 
The direct measurement of higher-order risk preferences, such as prudence, has been sparked by 
the lottery-based and model-free definition by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) (see also Eeck-
houdt and Schlesinger, 2013, for a comprehensive review.) For an individual with initial positive 
wealth W they define risk aversion and prudence (as well as higher-order risk preferences more 
generally) in terms of  preferences over pairs of lotteries. Each lottery has two potential outcomes 
x and y and is denoted by [x; y]. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define risk aversion as weakly 
preferring a lottery [W-k1; W-k2] over a lottery [W-k1-k2; W], where k1>0 and k2>0 are sure losses. 
They define prudence as weakly preferring a lottery [W-k1; W+ε] over a lottery [W-k1+ ε; W], 
where ε is a zero-mean risk (i.e., a lottery with an expected value of zero). While risk-averse in-
dividuals like to disaggregate two sure losses, prudent individuals like to disaggregate a sure loss 
and an additional zero-mean risk. In other words, risk aversion corresponds to a preference for a 
lower spread in payoffs and prudence to a preference for facing additional risk in better states of 
the world (prudence is therefore sometimes also called downside risk aversion). 
Based on these definitions, risk aversion and prudence have been measured in a series of papers 
which Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2018) survey. Most of these papers elicit risk preferences in 
                                                 
1 For example,  Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) show that the sign of the third-order derivative of the utility func-
tion drives precautionary savings. Other examples include auctions for objects of uncertain value (Esö and White, 
2004); bargaining (White, 2008); and the uptake of preventive health measures (Courbage and Rey, 2006, 2016). 
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the gain domain using choices between lottery pairs (Ebert and Wiesen, 2011; Noussair et al., 
2014; Deck and Schlesinger, 2014; Breaban et al., 2016; Haering et al., 2017; Ebert and van de 
Kuilen, 2017; Baillon et al., 2018). Some alternatively elicit risk and prudence premia using a 
multiple price list (Ebert and Wiesen, 2014; Heinrich and Mayrhofer, 2018) or elicit preferences 
in the loss domain (Maier and Rüger, 2013; Bleichrodt and van Bruggen, 2018). With respect to 
the loss domain the evidence is ambiguous, but with respect to the gain domain most find a ma-
jority of choices to be risk averse and prudent for binary choices as well as for a multiple price 
list.2 For the sake of comparability with the majority of studies, we opt to elicit risk preferences in 
the gain domain using binary lottery choices. 
When comparing risk aversion across age groups, the evidence from previous experiments does 
not show a clear age effect. In an initial study, Harbaugh et al. (2002) analyze risk aversion of 
children and adolescents aged 5 to 20 as well as of adults aged 21 to 64. They observe no correla-
tion between age and a preference for gambles over certain amounts of equal expected value. 
Levin et al. (2007) compare the risky choices by 9 to 11 year old children to the choices the same 
children made 3 years earlier. They find a significant within-subject correlation but also no age 
effects for risk aversion. Furthermore, Sutter et al. (2013) do not observe age effects in their study 
with children and adolescents ranging from 10 to 18 years. Khachatryan et al. (2015) find a gen-
der-dependent age effect. They study risk aversion of boys and girls in two age groups (7 to 12 
years and 12 to 16 years). In their sample risk aversion of boys decreases with age while girls’ 
risk aversion stays constant.3 
                                                 
2 Note that higher-order risk preferences have also been elicited within the expected utility theory framework by 
Tarazona-Gomez (2004) and by Krieger and Mayrhofer (2012, 2017). 
3 A large literature in psychology pioneered by Slovic (1966) and surveyed in a meta-study by Defoe et al. (2015) 
also considers risk taking by children and adolescents. Many studies in this field are motivated by the question why 
adolescents are more likely than adults to engage in behavior which is commonly regarded as “risky” like reckless 
driving or experimenting with drugs (see, e.g., Dahl, 2004, Steinberg, 2007). Defoe et al. (2015) analyze the results 
of 25 experimental studies. They find that children (5 to 10 years) do not differ in their risk taking from early adoles-
cents (11 to 13 years). But early adolescents take more risk than older adolescents (14 to 19 years). However, as they 
point out, the employed tasks vary by whether they elicit preferences on the gain or loss domain and by whether 
probability distributions over payoffs are known or unknown. Also, many of the studies in this field are not incentiv-
ized or do not systematically differentiate between the different moments of probability distributions. 
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Several survey based investigations have found positive correlation between the risk aversion of 
adult children and that of their parents (see, e.g., Kimball et al., 2009, Dohmen et al., 2011, 
Necker and Voskort, 2014), providing evidence for the intergenerational transmission of risk 
aversion. In addition, experimental studies that correlate decisions in incentivized tasks observe 
correlations between children’s and their parents risk aversion: Levin and Hart (2003) find a sig-
nificant correlation between the risk aversion of 6 to 8 year old children and that of their parents 
(79% of them mothers). However, this correlation is insignificant in their follow-up study with 
the same subjects three years later, as reported in Levin et al. (2007). Alan et al. (2017) study risk 
aversion of 7 to 8 year old children and their mothers. They find that the risk aversion of girls 
(but not of boys) correlates with their mother’s risk aversion.  
There is evidence that a considerable part of variability of decision making under uncertainty is 
determined genetically as documented, for example, in twin studies on risk aversion (Cesarini et 
al., 2009; Zhong et al., 2009; Zyphur et al. 2009) and on financial investments (Cesarini et al., 
2010; Barnea et al., 2010). Heritability may explain the transmission of risk preferences from 
parents to their children. However, the environment also appears to be an important driver of risk 
taking. A recent study by Black et al (2017) on adoptees finds that the portfolio risk adoptees take 
on is more strongly correlated with that of their adoptive than their biological parents (see also 
Fagereng et al., 2018). In addition, a number of studies suggest that risk preferences are influ-
enced by the general characteristics of the household within which children grow up. Deckers et 
al. (2017) observe that 7 to 9 year old children who grow up in households of parents with low 
income or low education are less risk averse than other children. Falk and Kosse (2016) interpret 
breastfeeding duration as a measure of quality of the early childhood environment. In a sample of 
preschool children aged 5.9 years on average, they find that shorter breastfeeding is associated 
with lower risk aversion (and lower levels of patience and altruism).  
In this study we connect the emerging literature on higher-order risk preferences with previous 
work on the development and transmission of risk aversion. We measure risk aversion and pru-
dence in two primary schools, one middle school and one high school in the mainland Chinese 
sub-provincial city of Xiamen. For this purpose, we developed a simple preference elicitation 
task suitable for young children. We ran all experiments during the usual class time and are thus 
able to rule out self selection into the experiment. We also used a survey to collect the stated risk 
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preferences of parents and household information. Furthermore, we obtained additional infor-
mation from the school records.  
Our results with respect to the preferences of children and adolescents reveal that subjects from 
grades 5 to 11 (10 to 17 years) make mostly risk averse and prudent choices. With respect to risk 
aversion behavior of 3rd graders (8 to 9 years) does not differ statistically from risk neutrality. We 
also find 3rd graders to make mostly prudent choices, however, this effect is driven by one of the 
two primary schools we sampled from. We also find evidence for a transmission of preferences: 
risk aversion is significantly correlated between children and their parents. Also, prudence is sig-
nificantly correlated between girls (but not boys) and their parents. 
In section 2 we will describe our elicitation method and process of data collection. In section 3 
we present the results. After describing the summary statistics, we first focus on the basic ques-
tion of whether children and adolescents are risk averse and prudent. We then present our results 
on the transmission of risk preferences and consider the development of risk preferences with 
age. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of our findings. 
 
2  Study design  
2.1 Preference elicitation 
Our goal is to test for risk aversion and prudence in a classroom setting. For this purpose, we 
need a method that can be explained quickly and is easy to understand for participants with little 
knowledge of mathematics. Nevertheless we also want to build on established methods so that 
our results are readily comparable to existing studies.  
Various tools have been applied to measure risk preferences in experiments with adults (see Har-
rison and Rutström, 2008, Charness et al., 2013, and Haering and Heinrich, 2017, for overviews). 
We also use lottery pairs to measure risk preferences. As pointed out above, most studies on 
higher-risk preferences do so. Also, this approach fulfils our requirement of being simple and it 
also has been applied successfully with young children (Deckers et al., 2017).4  
                                                 
4 Other simple risk elicitation tasks that have been used to elicit children’s’ risk preferences are the devil’s task 
(Slovic, 1966) used by Falk and Kosse (2016) or the investment task by Charness and Gneezy (2010) used by An-
5 
In the design of our elicitation method, we build on Deck and Schlesinger’s (2014) study. They 
have developed 38 random lottery pairs that allow measuring first to sixth order risk preferences 
which are also used in subsequent studies (Deck and Schlesinger, 2018, Haering et al., 2017). We 
select seven of their lottery pairs: one first-order dominance task, three risk aversion tasks and 
three prudence tasks. Table 1 shows the parameters of the tasks.5 We deviate from the task frame 
of Deck and Schlesinger (2014).  Most lotteries in these pairs are compound lotteries. Deck and 
Schlesinger depicted and resolved uncertainty through a sequence of binary lotteries; represented 
as a series of random wheel spins. We presented the same lotteries in their reduced form, repre-
sented as random draw from an opaque bag containing four marbles of different colors.  
 
Table 1: Parameters of the pair-wise lottery choice tasks 
  Option A  Option B D&S 
Task 
Nr. Order Outcomes 
Exp. 
Pay. Var. Skew.  Outcomes 
Exp. 
Pay. Var. Skew. 
Task 
Nr. 
1 1 4; 4; 4; 4 4 0 0  7; 7; 7; 7 7 0 0 2 
2 2 4; 4; 10; 10 7 9 0  7; 7; 7; 7 7 0 0 9 
3 2 2; 2; 12; 12 7 25 0  4; 4; 10; 10 7 9 0 5 
4 2 1; 1; 19; 19 10 81 0  10; 10; 10; 10 10 0 0 10 
5 3 3; 7; 10; 10 7.5 8.25 -15  5; 5; 8; 12 7.5 8.25 15 11 
6 3 1; 9; 10; 10 7.5 14.25 -60  5; 5; 6; 14 7.5 14.25 60 13 
7 3 6; 10; 10; 10 9 3 -6  8; 8; 8; 12 9 3 6 16 
 
All choices were displayed using four marbles as illustrated in Figure 1. It shows the two options 
available in Task 11 by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) as it was operationalized in our experiment. 
Both options have the same expected payoff and the same variance but differ in their skewness. 
The lottery on the left has lower skewness, i.e. a larger downside risk. The letters indicate the 
                                                                                                                                                              
gerer et al. (2015) and Sutter et al. (2015). Sutter et al. (2013) use the more complicated multiple price list. However, 
their youngest participants are ten years old, two years older than the youngest in our study. 
5 The tasks were selected, so that the decisions of each order are incentivized approximately equally. Due to time 
constraints we were not able to use the full sets of lottery pairs used by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) in the respective 
orders. For the same reason (and because we feared that they would be too complex for the youngest participants), 
we did not elicit higher-order risk preferences beyond prudence. 
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color of each marble (green, blue, yellow and white) which were replaced with the symbol for the 
respective color in the original Chinese version of the instructions.  
 
 
Figure 1: Prudence lottery task 
               
G: green, B: blue, Y: yellow, W: white; in the original instructions  
these letters were replaced with the Chinese symbol for the respective color. 
 
2.2 Experimental procedures 
We conducted all experiments during regularly scheduled class times by the same lead experi-
menter who was supported by six extensively trained assistants. We held all sessions in either the 
school’s library or a classroom.6 At the beginning of each session, the rules of the experiment 
were carefully explained by the lead experimenter.7 We stressed that we wanted participants to 
understand all procedures, encouraged questions and took ample time to answer them. We also 
made clear that choices have to be made individually and that talking to other students is forbid-
den. 
All participants had to successfully answer two control questions.to demonstrate comprehension 
of the tasks. The students proceeded to make their choices by noting them in a paper booklet il-
lustrating the different lotteries.8 We randomized the presentation of the left and right lotteries 
between booklets. We use dummy variable Flipped to indicate which of the two presentations 
                                                 
6 See Appendix C for a picture of the experimental setting. 
7 See Appendix B for the complete protocol translated from Chinese. 
8 For the English translation of a primary schools subject’s decision booklet see Appendix A. The booklet contained 
lottery choices in the order shown in Table 1. The advantage of eliciting dominance choices before prudence ones is 
the increase of complexity over the course of the experiment which can help subjects to get used to the decision 
environment. See Noussair et al. (2014) and Heinrich and Mayrhofer (2018) for similar arguments. 
5 
5 8 
12 W 
G B 
Y 7 
3 10 
10 W 
G B 
Y 
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was used.  There was no feedback over the course of decision making. Payments were only de-
termined at the very end. For this purpose, one task was drawn for payment. This task was the 
same for all participants and it was determined by a draw from bingo cage. After which the assis-
tants approached the students one by one by and determined the outcome of their chosen lottery 
in the respective task. For this, one marble was drawn from an opaque bag containing the four 
marbles and then the student was paid accordingly.9 
The students’ grades, their Hukou status and gender were collected directly from the schools’ 
administrations. The Hukou is a household registration system that is used in China to categorize 
between local and non-local as well as between urban and rural citizens. We use the local/non-
local Hukou status as a proxy for migratory experience. As observed by Jaeger et al. (2010), for 
example, migrants tend to be more risk seeking.10  
The third data set we collect uses a survey instrument given to the students’ parents.11 After the 
experiment student participants received an envelope containing a questionnaire for their parents. 
It was explained that this envelope was to be filled out by their parents, signed by them and re-
turned to the respective teacher. Parents received RMB 40 (approximately US$ 6.45 at the time) 
for returning the questionnaire. In this questionnaire parents were presented with the same lottery 
pairs. We were not able to incentivize their decisions but scaled up the hypothetical payoffs by a 
factor of 1,000 (relative to those of the primary school children) to make payoffs more salient.12 
In addition, we asked who filled out the questionnaire (the mother, the father or someone else) 
                                                 
9 Note that there were 13 decisions over all, one of which was selected at random using the bingo cage. We also 
asked subjects to make six additional decisions in a savings task after they made the seven choices described above. 
In this task subject could forgo immediate payoffs and earn interest by getting paid two weeks later at a second ex-
periment (unrelated to the current study). However, we found virtually no variation in savings behavior because most 
subjects saved as much as they could. We therefore do not report these results. By coincidence the savings task was 
never selected for payment.  
10 See Song (2014) for a review of the Hukou system and Afridi et al. (2015) or Gu et al. (2016) for an experimental 
study that exploits differences in Hukou status. 
11 See Appendix C for a translated excerpt from this questionnaire. 
12 Note that in their comprehensive study, Noussair et al. (2014) observe no difference in risk aversion and prudence 
(and temperance) between incentivized and non-incentivized lotteries for adults. However, for hypothetical stakes, 
framing matters: Larger hypothetical stakes lead to more risk aversion but to no change in prudence.  
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and how many members of the household have a high school degree and how many have a uni-
versity degree (none, one, two or more). We also asked about the number of houses or apartments 
the members of the family owned altogether (none, one, two or more).13 We use this as a proxy of 
wealth as this is the primary store of wealth for Chinese citizens. 
Table 2 presents our experimental design. We collect data at six grade levels covering children in 
the age range from 8 to 17 years. Across schools we used the same experimental procedures. Af-
ter consulting with several teachers, we decided to pay all students in cash (see Brosig-Koch et 
al., 2015, and Geng et al., 2015 for a similar procedure). Based on these consultations we used 
the same incentives within each school, but we doubled the primary school’s pay for the middle 
school and tripled it for the high school. That means, lotteries paid between RMB 1 and RMB 19 
for 3rd and 5th graders (between US$ 0.16 and US$ 3.06) and between RMB 3 and RMB 57 for 
10th and 11th graders (between US$ 0.48 and US$ 9.19). Also, note that Vieider (2012) finds no 
influence of variations up to 20% in payoffs on second-order risk aversion.  
A challenge of cross-sectional studies that compare different age groups consists of finding com-
parable samples. We selected four schools from urban districts of Xiamen (population of around 
2,000,000): a primary school from the Huli district, a middle school from the Haicang district and 
a high school from the Siming district.  The public Xiamen school system has approximately 300 
primary, 60 middle and 35 high schools.  The primary and middle school one attends depends 
upon their home address, but the high school they attend depends upon their performance on an 
entrance exam.  
Based on the results from our first sample we also collected data from a second primary school, 
from the Huli district of Xiamen, due to a strong imbalance between the proportion of local and 
non-local Hukou holders. Relative to the two other schools a larger share of participants at the 
first primary school was migrants. Therefore we collected a second sample at another primary 
school with a share of migrants that is similar to that in the middle and the high school in a fol-
low-up sample. At this school we used exactly the same experimental procedures and the study 
                                                 
13 See Appendix C for these items of the questionnaire. Note that each child only received one questionnaire. We 
asked for the responder’s relationship to the child but we did not fix which household member had to answer the 
questionnaire because of single-parent households. Therefore, we cannot exclude self-selection effects, e.g. through 
children who prefer to give the questionnaire to the parent that is more similar to them in terms of risk preferences. 
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was conducted by the same lead experimenter. In the following we present results on the full 
samples including regressions that control for Hukou status. If not mentioned otherwise, our main 
observations persist when using data from either one of the two primary schools. Appendix E 
includes additional analyses using only data from one of the two primary schools at a time. 
 
Table 2: Experimental design 
   Order of events   
Grade School type Monetary 
incentives 
1: Control 
questions 
2: Tasks 
 
Sample N 
3 Primary 1 1x yes 1 to 7 Initial 46 
5 Primary 1  1x yes 1 to 7 Initial 50 
7 Middle  2x yes 1 to 7 Initial 44 
8 Middle  2x yes 1 to 7 Initial 45 
10 High  3x yes 1 to 7 Initial 41 
11 High  3x yes 1 to 7 Initial 40 
3 Primary 2 1x yes 1 to 7 Follow-up 48 
5 Primary 2 1x yes 1 to 7 Follow-up 48 
Monetary incentives: Payoffs as shown in Table1 were scaled up by a factor of 2x or 3x.  
 
 
 
3  Results 
3.1 Summary statistics 
Overall 362 subjects were recruited for the experiment as shown in Table 2. However, we ex-
cluded six subjects from our analysis because they were not able to answer the control questions 
correctly (three subjects from grade 3, two from grade 5 and one from grade 8). Furthermore, two 
more subjects are excluded because of missing personal data (one subject in grade 3 and one in 
grade 10). This leaves us with 354 subjects at six grade levels. Table 3 summarizes these obser-
vations. Next to the number of subjects it displays summary statistics of their individual charac-
teristics, namely the average age in months and their average grade in math. Math performance is 
graded on a scale from 0 to 100 in primary school (grades 3 and 5) and on a scale from 0 to 150 
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in middle and high school (grades 7 to 11).14 Additionally, Table 3 shows the share of female 
subjects. The last two columns show the average number (out of three) of risk averse or prudent 
choices. 
Table 3: Summary statistics student subjects 
Grade N Age in 
months 
Grade 
math 
Female Number 
risk 
averse 
choices 
Number 
prudent 
choices 
3 90 110.78 81.23 0.46 1.57 1.77 
5 96 133.53 80.03 0.45 2.15 1.86 
7 44 158.93 112.5 0.43 2.43 2.25 
8 44 170.39 81.57 0.43 2.39 1.93 
10 40 193.53 70.03 0.53 2.38 2.15 
11 40 205.93 82.85 0.72 2.42 2.15 
Total 354 150.44 83.75 0.49 2.12 1.96 
 
We provide some summary statistics from the survey given to parents. Only nine parents did not 
return the questionnaire, fifty-one of the 345 returned questionnaires were not filled out com-
pletely and five were filled out by someone other than the mother or the father. Table 4 contains 
the summary statistics of the remaining 289 questionnaires that we use to characterize the chil-
dren’s environment at home. “Low education”, “high education” and “house owner” are dum-
mies that are constructed from the answers in the parent questionnaire. All households in which 
parents indicated that no household member has a high school or university degree are classified 
as “low education” households. Those households with at least one member having a university 
degree are classified as “high education” households. The indicator “house owner” takes the val-
                                                 
14 The number of subjects the children attend differs by grade. The only two subjects attended by all children are 
mathematics and Chinese. In the following we focus on the grade in mathematics because it is often used as a proxy 
for general cognitive ability (see, e.g. Benjamin et al., 2013). The distribution of math grades differs from school to 
school. In the following we will only use a student’s grade quartile (the values 1, 2, 3, 4) within his or her class as a 
proxy math grade. 
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ue of one if the parents indicate that the household members own at least one house or apartment 
altogether.   
The Hukou status was collected directly from the official school records. “Local hukou address” 
takes a value of one if the child has the Hukou of the school’s local municipality, i.e. a Hukou 
from Xiamen for all four schools. The last two columns show the average number (out of three) 
of risk averse or prudent choices.  
The summary statistics reveal some heterogeneity between the households in the different grades 
and schools. In all grades the minority of questionnaires is answered by the mothers. The asym-
metry is most pronounced in grade 7 of the middle school. The share of families with low educa-
tion ranges from 3 percent in grade 10 to 38 percent in grade 8. Rates of high education and 
house ownership are less dispersed: They range from 17 to 31 percent and from 74 to 86 percent. 
After merging the data sets from two primary schools the share of local students is still somewhat 
lower in grades 3 and 5: 34 percent of children in grade 3 and 31 percent in grade 5 have a local 
Hukou address while at least 43 percent in higher grades do so. We will control for these differ-
ences in our regression analyses. 
The summary statistics also reveal that the number of risk averse choices is higher than the num-
ber of prudent choices in all grades. Recent evidence would lead us to expect the opposite rela-
tionship: Deck and Schlesinger (2014) have observed that lottery choices can be explained sur-
prisingly well by a preference for either combining “good” with “bad” or “good” with “good” 
implying mixed risk averse and mixed risk loving behavior (Schlesinger et al. 2009; Crainich et 
al., 2013). People with one of these two preference types differ in their lotteries choices in even 
orders but coincide in odd orders (e.g., risk averters and risk lovers are both prudent).15 In a relat-
ed study Haering et al. (2017) observe less temperate and less prudent choices in the reduced 
lotteries, which is consistent with the pattern observed in our study. 
                                                 
15 The observations by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) however are gathered using compound lotteries that make the 
combinations “good” with “bad” or “good” with good” salient. To facilitate understanding of the children and to 
simplify the determination of lottery outcomes we chose to use reduced versions of their compound prudence lotter-
ies. Reducing compound lotteries has been found to influence elicited risk aversion by Harrison et al. (2015) as well 
as prudence and temperance by Deck and Schlesinger (2018) and Haering et al. (2017). Deck and Schlesinger (2018) 
observe less temperate choices in the reduced than in the compound lotteries by Deck and Schlesinger (2014). 
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Table 4: Summary statistics household 
Grade N Mother Low  
education 
High  
education 
House 
owner 
Local 
Hukou  
address 
Number 
risk  
averse 
choices 
Number 
prudent 
choices 
3 67 0.48 0.37 0.22 0.75 0.34 1.78 1.7 
5 75 0.48 0.29 0.20 0.75 0.31 1.91 1.53 
7 36 0.36 0.25 0.31 0.86 0.50 2.08 1.83 
8 37 0.49 0.38 0.19 0.84 0.46 2.43 1.62 
10 39 0.46 0.03 0.21 0.77 0.44 2.05 1.74 
11 35 0.49 0.14 0.17 0.74 0.43 2.2 1.63 
Total 289 0.46 0.26 0.21 0.78 0.39 2.02 1.66 
 
 
3.2 Are children and adolescents risk averse and prudent? 
 
Risk aversion 
Behavior in the risk aversion tasks 2, 3 and 4 suggests that choices are not made randomly but 
with a general preference for the less risky option. Pooling choices across tasks 2, 3 and 4, bino-
mial tests reject the null hypothesis that only half the choices are risk averse within all grades (p 
< 0.001, two-sided binomial tests) except in grade 3 (p = 0.503).16  Figure 2 displays the distribu-
tion of the number of risk averse choices within the six grade levels we examine. The most fre-
quent choice pattern in all grades except grade 3 consists of perfectly risk averse choices.  
Observation 1: Subjects in grades 5 to 11 (but not in grade 3) make predominantly risk averse 
choices. 
Figure 3 displays the number of risk averse choices by girls and boys across grades. It reveals 
that female and male students differ only marginally in their behavior. When comparing the 
number of choices within grades we do not find any significant differences between boys and 
girls (p ≥ 0.326, two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests).  
 
                                                 
16 As shown in Table E.1 of Appendix E we find the same pattern in both primary schools. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of number of risk averse choices within grades 
 
Figure 3: Average number of risk averse choices by gender 
 
Prudence 
As in the risk aversion tasks, behavior in the prudence tasks 5, 6 and 7 suggest that choices are 
not made randomly. Instead most choices are prudent. Pooling choices across tasks 5, 6 and 7, 
binomial tests reject the null hypothesis that half the choices are prudent within all grades includ-
ing grade 3 (p ≤ 0.004, two-sided binomial tests). However, the tendency of 3rd graders to choose 
14 
prudently is driven by the second primary school we sampled. Third graders in the second school 
make prudent choices (p < 0.001) while choices of 3rd graders in the first school do not differ 
from random behavior (p = 0.929).17 Figure 4 displays the distributions of the number of prudent 
choices within grades of the joint sample. In case of prudence the mode of the choice distribu-
tions varies across grades: It is one for 3rd graders, two for 5th and 8th graders and three for 7th, 
10th and 11th graders.  
Observation 2: Subjects in grades 5 to 11 make predominantly prudent choices. The behavior of 
subjects in grade 3 differs by school. 
Figure 5 displays the average number of prudent choices made by girls and boys across grades. 
Again, there appear to be no pronounced gender gaps. Boys and girls do not differ in the number 
of prudent choices in any of the grades (p ≥ 0.151, two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests). 
  
                                                 
17 See Table E.2 of Appendix E for the respective test results. 
15 
Figure 4: Distribution of number of prudent choices within grades 
 
Figure 5: Average number of prudent choices by gender 
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3.3 How does the household influence risk preferences?  
In this subsection we focus on the transmission of preferences while controlling for characteris-
tics of the children’s household and for individual differences in regressions. Therefore, the fol-
lowing analyses are based on the subset of subjects for which all household information was 
available (summarized in Table 4).  
Table 5 provides initial evidence on the transmission of preferences by examining the joint distri-
bution of the children’s and parents’ lottery choices. It shows two contingency tables: number of 
risk averse choices on the left and number of prudent choices on the right. We observe a small 
but significant correlation within the risk tasks (Spearman’s Rho of 0.248, p < 0.001) and within 
in the prudence tasks (Spearman’s Rho of 0.173, p = 0.003). Furthermore, Chi-squared tests re-
ject the null hypothesis of independence in both cases (p ≤ 0.036).  
 
Table 5: Contingency tables for share of risk averse and prudent choices by children and parents 
Risk       Prudence      
 Parent    Parent  
Children 0 1 2 3 Total  Children 0 1 2 3 Total 
0 7 1 7 5 20  0 2 6 6 4 18 
1 7 14 17 14 52  1 15 19 26 13 73 
2 11 13 27 29 80  2 22 27 41 17 107 
3 8 22 33 74 137  3 11 14 32 34 91 
Total 33 50 84 122 289  Total 50 66 105 68 289 
Spearman’s Rho 0.248 p < 0.001, Chi2 test p < 0.001  Spearman’s Rho 0.173 p = 0.003, Chi2 test p = 0.036 
 
 
Additionally, we run several regressions that also shed more light on potential age effects. We 
run ordered logit regressions to identify the influences on the number of risk averse or prudent 
choices. We first focus on risk aversion before considering the influences of individual and 
household characteristics on prudence. 
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Risk aversion 
Table 6 presents three ordered logit regressions on the number of risk averse choices. The results 
are reported as average marginal effects and standard errors are clustered on the grade level. 
Model (1) is fitted on the whole sample while models (2) and (3) only consider girls or boys. 
The three regression models indicate the existence of age effects within our sample: The joint F-
tests of the Grade and Grade 3 coefficients are significant in all models (p < 0.001). The regres-
sions also reveal gender-specific age effects: In the overall sample we find third graders to be 
significantly less risk averse than the remaining children (p < 0.001) while the Grade effect is 
insignificant (p = 0.742). When splitting the regressions by gender, a significant Grade 3 effect is 
observed only in the male sample (p < 0.001 for boys and p = 0.167 for girls). The Grade varia-
ble reveals a significantly positive effect for girls and a significantly negative effect for boys (p ≤ 
0.038). We find two differences between the two primary school which are not presented in Table 
6. Participants at the second school make significantly less risk averse choices (p ≤ 0.002). Fur-
thermore, we find a significant positive correlation between math grade and the number of risk 
averse choices made by girls (p = 0.015). 
With respect to the household characteristics, we confirm the finding of a positive and significant 
correlation between the number of risk averse choices made by parents and their children (cf. 
Table 5). In the whole sample one more parental risk averse choice leads to 0.094 more risk 
averse choices by their children (p < 0.001). For girls the increase is somewhat smaller than for 
boys (0.075 versus 0.104) but both increases are significant (p = 0.036 and p = 0.008).18 
Observation 3: Risk aversion is significantly correlated between parents and their children after 
controlling for individual and household characteristics. 
The remaining household characteristics (parental education level, house ownership status and 
Hukou status) also influence children’s choices significantly: The joint F-tests of these remaining 
variables are significant in all of the three models (p ≤ 0.001). A high education of parents is as-
sociated with more risk taking in the complete sample (p = 0.048). Splitting the sample reveals 
                                                 
18 See Tables E.3 and E.4 in Appendix E for the regression results we obtain when including only one of the two 
primary schools. 
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that the effect is driven by the girls in our sample: We find a significant influence for girls (p = 
0.008) but not for boys (p = 0.539). Parents’ house ownership is significantly associated with less 
risk taking in the complete sample (p < 0.001). In the subsamples this effect is significant for 
girls (p < 0.001) and weakly significant for boys (p = 0.090). A local Hukou address is neither 
associated with risk taking in the complete sample nor in one of the subsamples (p ≥ 0.220). 
 
Table 6: Ordered logit regressions on the number of risk averse choices (average marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Girls Boys 
    
Grade 0.003 0.029*** -0.023** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) 
Grade 3 -0.156*** -0.039 -0.255*** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.040) 
Second primary school -0.184*** -0.084*** -0.271*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.039) 
Math 0.041 0.047** 0.043 
 (0.033) (0.020) (0.057) 
Female 0.016   
 (0.039)   
Number of risk averse choices 0.094*** 0.075** 0.104*** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.039) 
Low education -0.001 -0.019 0.026 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.095) 
High education -0.112** -0.195*** -0.052 
 (0.057) (0.074) (0.084) 
House owner 0.146*** 0.186*** 0.128* 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.076) 
Local Hukou address 0.052 0.079 0.038 
 (0.048) (0.064) (0.076) 
Flipped booklet 0.045 0.077 0.014 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.043) 
    
Observations 289 142 147 
    
Specification tests    
(p-values F-test)    
    
Grade, Grade 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low education, high education, 
house owner, local Hukou 
0.001 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Prudence 
While we observe a robust influence of individual and household characteristics with respect to 
risk aversion, their influence on prudence is less clear. Table 7 presents the regression results of 
our first specification that regresses the number of prudent choices on these characteristics.  
First of all, we also observe some significant age effects on prudence after controlling for further 
individual differences and for household differences: The joint F-tests of the Grade and Grade 3 
coefficients are significant in full data set (p = 0.002) and for girls (p < 0.001) but insignificant 
for boys (p = 0.965). However, we do not find a significant effect of the Grade 3 variable (p ≥ 
0.627) in any of the samples. There is a significant positive Grade effect in the complete sample 
(p = 0.045). Yet, Grade is weakly significant in the female subsample (p = 0.088) and insignifi-
cant in the male subsample (p = 0.793). Even though they affected risk taking, we neither find an 
systematic effect of the second primary school (p ≥ 0.484) nor a gender effect with respect to the 
complete sample (p = 0.729). A better math grade, however, is significantly associated with a 
larger number of prudent choices in the whole sample (p = 0.004) and in the female subsample (p 
= 0.032). In the male subsample the correlation is only weakly significant (p = 0.056). 
Considering the household characteristics, the regressions confirm the positive and significant 
correlation between the number of prudent choices made by parents and their children (cf. Table 
5). In the whole sample one more parental prudent choice leads to 0.061 more prudent choices by 
their children (p = 0.064). But this effect is driven by the girls: It is only significant for them (p = 
0.009 for girls and p = 0.302 for boys) and it is more than twice as large for girls than for boys 
(0.090 versus 0.041).19  
Observation 4: Prudence is significantly correlated between parents and their daughters (but 
not their sons) after controlling for individual and household characteristics. 
  
                                                 
19 See Tables E.5 and E.6 in Appendix E for the regression results we obtain when including only one of the two 
primary schools. Note that the influence of parents’ number of prudent choices is at least weakly significant in both 
samples. As the result is not robust to merging the data sets, we opted for the current interpretation of our results.  
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Table 7: Ordered logit regressions on the number of prudent choices (average marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Girls Boys 
    
Grade 0.023** 0.036* 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) 
Grade 3 0.024 0.050 0.011 
 (0.056) (0.103) (0.069) 
Second primary school 0.038 -0.002 0.074 
 (0.061) (0.084) (0.105) 
Math 0.053*** 0.053** 0.063* 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.033) 
Female 0.022   
 (0.063)   
Number of prudent choices 0.061* 0.090*** 0.041 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) 
Low education 0.013 -0.068* 0.069 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.058) 
High education 0.048 -0.039 0.128 
 (0.061) (0.080) (0.080) 
House owner -0.030 -0.013 -0.050 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.057) 
Local Hukou address 0.040 0.101 0.004 
 (0.028) (0.069) (0.065) 
Flipped booklet -0.047** 0.047 -0.142*** 
 (0.020) (0.043) (0.025) 
    
Observations 289 142 147 
    
Specification tests    
(p-values F-test)    
    
Grade, Grade 3 0.002 0.000 0.965 
Low education, high education, 
house owner, local Hukou 
0.000 0.534 0.446 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The remaining household characteristics affect children’s choices significantly in the whole sam-
ple (p < 0.001) but not in the separate samples (p ≥ 0.446) as the F-tests reveal. With respect to 
the individual effects, we find that girls who grow up in a household with low educational level 
make weakly significantly less prudent choices (p = 0.099). This effect is neither found in the 
complete sample (p = 0.648) nor in the male subsample (p = 0.228). None of the remaining 
household characteristics is found to be significant on its own.20  
 
 
4  Conclusion 
In this study we measure risk aversion and prudence of Chinese children and adolescents in two 
primary schools, one middle school and one high school. Choices by 3rd graders do not differ 
significantly from choices under risk neutrality, but 5th to 11th graders make significantly risk 
averse choices. Furthermore, 5th to 11th graders make significantly prudent choices. We also find 
3rd graders to make significantly prudent choices. However, this effect is driven by the second 
primary school we recruited from. We do not find any gender differences with respect to risk 
aversion or prudence. Yet, risk aversion appears to increase more gradually with age in girls than 
in boys. In addition we find evidence for the transmission of risk preferences from parents to 
children: Risk aversion correlates between parents and their sons and daughters while prudence 
correlates between parents and their daughters (but not their sons). 
It is interesting to note that we do not observe any gender differences with respect to risk aversion 
and prudence. Often adult men are described to be less risk averse than women (see, e.g., the 
overview by Croson and Gneezy, 2009, and the results from China reported by Gong and Yang, 
2012, and Zhang, 2018). Yet the difference appears to be small and depends on the elicitation 
task as pointed out in the meta-study by Filippin and Crosetto (2016). With respect to children 
and adolescents, the evidence suggests a similar pattern. Cárdenas et al. (2012) study risk aver-
sion of children aged 9 to 12 years in samples from Columbia and Sweden. They find boys to be 
less risk averse than girls. A similar observation is made by Borghans et al. (2009) for Dutch ado-
                                                 
20 Additionally, we observe that participants who were presented with the flipped booklet are significantly less pru-
dent on aggregate (p = 0.020) so they have a preference for the option presented second. Considering both genders 
separately we observe a significant influence for boys (p < 0.001) but not for girls (p = 0.266).  
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lescents aged 15 to 16 years and by Sutter et al. (2013) for Austrian children and adolescents 
aged 10 to 18 years. In the USA, Harbaugh et al. (2002) find no gender differences in their sam-
ples of children and adolescents aged 5 to 20 while Eckel et al. (2012) find male high school stu-
dents in grades 9 and 11 to be less risk averse than girls. However, risk preferences may be 
shaped by environmental factors. Booth and Nolen (2012) study risk preferences of adolescents 
in grades 10 and 11 (15 years old on average) in the UK. They only find a gender difference for 
students in mixed schools but not when comparing children from single sex schools. Further-
more, they find girls to make somewhat less risk averse choices when preferences are elicited in 
all-girls groups. 
While we do not observe gender differences in the levels of risk aversion and prudence, the 
transmission of preferences differs by gender: The correlation in the number of prudent choices is 
driven by the girls in our sample. Alan et al. (2017) report a similar finding for risk aversion. 
They only find a significant correlation between mothers and their daughters but not between 
mothers and their sons. We also find differences with respect to prudence between the two prima-
ry schools. These may be driven by unobserved differences in the school environment. Eckel et 
al. (2012) have reported differences between schools in risk aversion between high schools. In an 
experimental study conducted in nine different high schools in the USA, they find that risk aver-
sion varies with characteristics like class size and teachers’ levels of education. 
Our findings are important with respect to field behavior and the design and timing of potential 
policy measures. Risk preferences are not only central to many economic models. They have also 
been shown to influence outcomes across the lifespan. For example, those who report lower risk 
aversion in surveys also choose careers with higher variance of income as observed by Bonin et 
al. (2007) and Fouarge et al. (2014). When measuring risk preferences of children and adoles-
cents between 10 and 18 years, Sutter et al. (2013) find that less risk averse subjects have a high-
er body mass index (while there is no significant correlation with whether they save money, 
smoke or spend money on alcohol or with their conduct at school). Furthermore, 7 to 9 year old 
children who grow up in households with low income or low education are less risk averse as 
observed by Deckers et al. (2017). In a follow-up survey conducted 4 to 5 years later, they also 
find that lower risk aversion in the initial experiment is positively correlated with lower grades 
and juvenile offences. Castillo et al. (2018) also correlate adolescents’ experimentally elicited 
risk preferences with field behavior. They find that less risk averse 8th graders (14 years old on 
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average) have more disciplinary referrals one to two years later and are less likely to graduate 
from high school. 
There is much less direct evidence on the relevance of prudence for field behavior. Only Noussair 
et al. (2014) find more prudent lottery choices to be correlated with greater wealth, a greater like-
lihood of having a savings account and a lower likelihood of credit card debt in a representative 
survey of the adult Dutch population. Note, however, that our finding of prudence in children 
adolescents is also important when designing policies that relate to inter-temporal decision mak-
ing. Sutter et al. (2013), for example, find more impatient children and adolescents to be less like-
ly to save money and more likely to smoke and to spend money on alcohol. More impatient chil-
dren also receive worse grades for their conduct at school (while there is no significant correla-
tion with their body mass index). But in inter-temporal optimization higher-order risk preferences 
determine today’s reaction to future changes in risk as shown by Leland (1968) and Sandmo 
(1970). For a given level of risk aversion and a given discount factor an increase in (second-
order) risk of future income, for example, yields an increase in today’s savings if and only if the 
decision maker is prudent.  
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Appendix A: Primary school decision booklet  (translated from Chinese) 
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Appendix B: Experimental Protocol (translated from Chinese) 
 
Material 
 Twelve non-transparent bag and 48 balls in four different colors 
 One bingo cage and 13 balls numbered 1 to 13  
 Big envelopes for questionnaire (“To the parents – Please answer before [date two schools 
days after the experiment]; Student name: ______________; Student ID: _____________”) 
 One receipt per class 
 Pens 
 Session sheet to note the selected task, duration, special occurrences etc. in each session. 
 Money for subject payment 
 
 
Experiment 
 
PREPARATION 
 
 Lead experimenter and assistants fill the envelopes with questionnaires for parents and place 
them at each desk 
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 Lead experimenter and assistants place a pen and the two workbooks at each desk 
 Lead experimenter and assistants prepare the twelve  bags, the four balls for each bag and the 
bingo cage with 13 balls 
 Lead experimenter fill in session parameters (school, grade, date) in session sheet 
 Lead experimenter assigns a group of seats to each assistant. Each assistant is responsible for 
the subjects in their group 
 Lead experimenter distributes bags, marbles and money for subject payment among the assis-
tants 
 Teachers bring students to the lab, lead experimenter note arrival time in session sheet 
 Lead experimenter counts the participants and note in session sheet 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Once everyone took a seat lead the experimenter explains the experiment: 
Hello and welcome! Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. And we want to remind 
you that we will return in two weeks and you will participate in a second and different experi-
ment. 
Today you are taking part in an experiment in which you will be able to earn money. How much 
money you will earn depends on your decisions. We will tell you in a moment what the experi-
ment is about. First of all there are two important rules:  
1. If you do not understand something raise your hand. Someone will come to answer your ques-
tion. 
2. Do no talk with other students. If don’t follow this rule you will be excluded from this experi-
ment, and earn no money. This also means: do not use your phone. If you have one with you, turn 
it off now and put it away. 
In front of you there are two workbooks, one envelope and a pen. Please write your name and 
student ID on the envelope. Now also write your name and student ID on the two workbooks. 
Then leave the three things on your desk in front of you. If you need help with this, just raise your 
hand and one of my assistants will come to help you. 
Now let’s return to the experiment. Today’s experiment will consist of three parts. In the first part 
you will complete 7 decision tasks. In each of these tasks you will choose one from a pair of re-
wards. In the second part of the experiment, you will complete an additional 6 decision tasks. In 
each of these tasks you will choose one from a group of 8 rewards. All rewards are real Chinese 
dollars. In part three, we will choose your reward. We will choose one of these 13 tasks from 
parts one and two by spinning this bingo cage containing balls numbered 1 through 13 [spin the 
cage while saying this]. Your teacher will help me doing this. Then selecting one of the balls at 
random [stop and catch one ball at random] like this. The number of the selected ball will be the 
number of the task we select.  After we select the task, then an assistant will visit each of you in-
dividually to determine your individual prize and pay you.  
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 lead experimenter explain urns: 
Before we start part one, let me explain how you will earn money during this study. We will pay 
you a RMB prize that is based on your selection of different balls. For each ball you select or that 
is selected randomly, you can receive the amount the ball is worth. For each of the tasks in the 
workbooks in front of you, you will see how much any ball is worth from the numbers on them.  
Sometimes balls will also have a certain color. The color of the ball helps to determine the total 
amount of the RMB prize you receive, if your payment is determined randomly. To determine 
your payment randomly we have brought price bags and the four colored balls with us. [Hold up 
a bag and show it to the students.] For example, suppose the balls correspond to the following 
prize amount: Green = 1 Kuai, White= 2 kuai, Blue= 3 kuai, and Yellow = 4 kuai.  If your pay-
ment is determined randomly, we would place the four balls in the bag, shake the bag to mix the 
balls, and then take one of the balls out of the bag without looking. An assistant would draw a 
ball as follows [demonstrate mixing and selecting a ball at random]. The color is ___ and there-
fore in this example you will get __ RMB added to your prize. 
Before we start part one, do not forget to keep quiet and to raise your hand whenever you have a 
question.  
Also, we will hand around a list during the experiment. On this list we will need the name and 
signature of everyone participating. Only if we have your signature, we can pay you in the end.  
[Hold up receipt and show it to the subjects.] 
 
PART 1 
 
 lead experimenter explains the task of part one: 
Now let’s start part one. Please take out the workbook with the label ‘Part 1.’ Do not start com-
pleting task sheets inside until we finish explaining the task and we give you the order to start.  
In this part, each page in the work book has a single decision task. There will be a choice of two 
bags. Please select the one you would like to draw a ball from if this task is selected in the end. 
To do this, you mark the bag you prefer with a check.  
Open your workbook to the first page with “QUIZ” written at the top to see an example. In price 
Bag 1, each of the four balls is matched to the dollar amount 3 kuai. In price Bag 2: Green (G) = 
2 kuai, White (W) = 2 kuai, Blue (B) = 3 kuai, and Yellow (Y) = 5 kuai. You must choose one of 
the two bags. Suppose this task had been selected to determine your prize, then we would select a 
ball from the bag you choose to determine the value of your prize.   
Please answer the two questions at the bottom of this page, and raise your hand when you are 
done. An assistant will come and check your answers. Also, you can raise your hand if you have a 
question and the assistant will come to answer your question. When everyone is done with the 
quiz, we will start part one. 
 Lead experimenter checks with the assistants that all subjects have gotten through the quiz 
correctly. If somebody did not answer correctly ask them to explain their answer. Listen 
35 
and then clarify any misunderstandings. Note the Student ID of any subject did not under-
stand the task even after explanation on the session sheet. 
We are now ready to complete the decision tasks in workbook one, this should take you no more 
than 10 minutes. When you are done, or if you have a question, raise your hand and your assis-
tant will come check your work or answer your question. Once everyone is done is we will move 
to part two. Now complete your decision tasks in workbook 1. 
 lead experimenter pass around the receipt list. Make sure that the participants sign it and 
pass it on. 
 Subjects have 10 minutes time, but this is a soft rule. After 10 minutes, assistants ap-
proach those still working and encourage them to finish. If they are still working 3 
minutes later, decide based on the overall timing. If there is a risk running late with the 
experiment, move to the next workbook and note the Student ID on the session sheet. If 
not, give them more time. 
 
PART 2 
 
 lead experimenter explains the workbook 2 tasks in general: 
Please put aside workbook 1, and take out the workbook with the label ‘Part 2.’ Again, do not 
start completing task sheets inside until we finish explaining the task and we give you the order to 
start.  
You will complete 6 decision tasks in this workbook. In each of these decision tasks you will 
choose one prize from a set of 8. The prizes here consist of two parts: an amount of money you 
will receive with certainty today and amount of money you will receive with certainty when we 
return in two weeks. […] 
 
PART 3 
 
 Lead experimenter determines the payoff-relevant task: 
As I explained in the beginning we will select one of the tasks you just did by selecting a ball from 
this bingo cage with the help of your teacher. Please stay at your seat while I select a ball. 
[Let the teacher select a Ball, announce the number on it, and hold it up] 
The selected task is ____. Please open workbook ___ to the task __ page. 
Please remain seated as the assistants will come up to you one at a time, to determine your pay-
offs, pay them to you, and collect your workbooks. Please be patient, remain quiet, and do not 
discuss your prize amount with others during this activity as you will take turns getting visited by 
the assistant. 
 Assistants determine payoff with subjects, write the determined payment on the respective 
pages of the workbooks and pay the subjects accordingly. 
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 Lead experimenter writes down the number of the selected task in the session sheet. 
 Assistants check that each student wrote his or her student ID correctly on the two workbooks 
and on the envelope. 
 Assistants collect the two workbooks. Then they ask the students to leave the envelope open 
and to give it to his or her parents after school. 
 Lead experimenter look for the receipt list and compare the number of signatures to the num-
ber of students. Note number of signatures on the session sheet. 
 
[If there is one or more signatures missing:] Please raise your hand if you have not signed the 
receipt yet. [Then pass the receipt to the respective participants and collect their signatures.] 
 
You all have an envelope in front of you. It is very important that you look carefully after this 
envelope and hand it to your parents after school! Just like you, your parents can earn some 
money if they receive the envelope from you today. Inside the envelope is a questionnaire they 
have to fill it out by [DATE ] The finished questionnaire should be put back into the envelope and 
returned to your teacher.  
The experiment is now over. Thank you for participating! 
 
 Note the time the class left on the session sheet 
 Count the workbooks and note the numbers on the session sheet 
 Copy the payoff amounts from the workbooks to the receipt 
 
Appendix C: Excerpt from parent questionnaire (translated from Chinese) 
 
 
What is your relationship to the child?  
 □ Mother   □ Father  □ Other 
How many people in your household have a high school degree or higher? 
 □ None   □ One  □ Two or more 
How many people in your household have a university degree or higher? 
 □ None   □ One  □ Two or more 
How many houses or apartments do the members of your household own altogether? 
 □ None   □ One  □ Two or more 
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Task 
In each of the seven tasks below you can choose between two urns. Each of these urns contains 
four balls. Please imagine that one of the four balls is randomly drawn from the urn you chose to 
determine your payoff. Each ball gives you a certain number of points as indicated by the number 
on the ball.  
Imagine that you would receive 1000 RMB for each point. For example, if  would be drawn 
from an urn, you would receive 1000 RMB. Which urn (top or bottom) would you prefer in each 
of the seven tasks? Please tick the appropriate box in each task. 
Task 1 
 
Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 
 
 
   
 
 
   
    
Task 5 
 
Task 6 Task 7  
 
 
  
 
   
 
8 
8 8 
12 5 
5 6 
14 5 
5 8 
12 
10 
6 10 
10 9 
1 10 
10 7 
3 10
4 
10
4 
10 
10 10 
10 4 
4 10 
10 7 
7 7 
7 7 
7 7 
7 
1 
1 19 
19 2 
2 12 
12 4 
4 10 
10 4 
4 4 
4 
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Appendix D: Picture classroom setting  
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Appendix E: Robustness Checks 
 
Binomial Tests 
 
Table E.1: Binomial tests p-values for risk aversion 
 
First pri- 
mary school 
(initial sample) 
 
Second pri-
mary school 
(follow-up) 
 
Both primary 
schools 
Middle 
school 
High 
school  
 
Grade 
3 
Grade 
5 
 
Grade 
3 
Grade 
5 
 
Grade 
3 
Grade 
5 
Grade 
7 
Grade 
8 
Grade 
10 
Grade 
11 
All 
subjects 
Task 2 0.878 0.006  0.471 0.312  0.461 0.006 0.001 0.01 0.038 0.001 0.000 
Task 3 0.878 0.001  0.013 0.111  0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Task 4 0.008 0.000  0.002 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
All tasks 0.247 0.000  0.934 0.000  0.503 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
p-values in bold if p < 5%. 
 
 
 
Table E.2: Binomial tests p-values for prudence 
 
First pri- 
mary school 
(initial sample) 
 
Second pri-
mary school 
(follow-up) 
 
Both primary 
schools 
Middle 
school 
High 
school  
 
Grade 
3 
Grade 
5 
 
Grade 
3 
Grade 
5 
 
Grade 
3 
Grade 
5 
Grade 
7 
Grade 
8 
Grade 
10 
Grade 
11 
All 
subjects 
Task 5 0.441 0.029  0.001 0.006  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.017 0.000 0.000 
Task 6 0.088 0.000  0.002 0.013  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Task 7 0.020 0.059  1.000 0.665  0.113 0.358 0.291 0.88 0.268 0.430 0.575 
All tasks 0.929 0.024  0.000 0.001  0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
p-values in bold if p < 5%. 
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Regressions 
 
Table E.3: Ordered logit regressions on the number of risk averse choices (average marginal effects) –
including first primary school (initial sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Girls Boys 
    
Grade 0.005 0.032*** -0.018 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) 
Grade 3 -0.178*** -0.023 -0.292*** 
 (0.036) (0.051) (0.059) 
Math 0.043 0.054* 0.047 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.061) 
Female -0.027   
 (0.052)   
Number of risk averse choices 0.113*** 0.079** 0.134*** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.048) 
Low education 0.004 -0.008 0.042 
 (0.094) (0.081) (0.123) 
High education -0.123 -0.221*** -0.040 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.114) 
House owner 0.179*** 0.174*** 0.172 
 (0.048) (0.037) (0.105) 
Local Hukou address 0.055 0.151* -0.023 
 (0.062) (0.081) (0.090) 
Flipped booklet 0.040 0.025 0.036 
 (0.039) (0.077) (0.056) 
    
Observations 223 109 114 
    
Specification tests    
(p-values F-test)    
    
Grade, Grade 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low education, high education, 
house owner, local Hukou 
0.002 0.000 0.023 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table E.4: Ordered logit regressions on the number of risk averse choices (average marginal effects) –
including second primary school (follow-up sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Girls Boys 
    
Grade 0.025 0.030*** 0.022 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.019) 
Grade 3 -0.239*** -0.145*** -0.330*** 
 (0.086) (0.041) (0.109) 
Math 0.029 0.066** -0.000 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.046) 
Female 0.063*   
 (0.034)   
Number of risk averse choices 0.087** 0.086** 0.087* 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) 
Low education 0.005 -0.062 0.053 
 (0.106) (0.080) (0.154) 
High education -0.049 -0.093 -0.028 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.106) 
House owner 0.112*** 0.218*** 0.006 
 (0.024) (0.044) (0.098) 
Local Hukou address 0.056 0.031 0.071 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.085) 
Flipped booklet 0.054 0.092* 0.022 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.060) 
    
Observations 213 109 104 
    
Specification tests    
(p-values F-test)    
    
Grade, Grade 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low education, high education, 
house owner, local Hukou 
0.000 0.000 0.872 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.5: Ordered logit regressions on the number of prudent choices (average marginal effects) – only 
including first primary school (initial sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Girls Boys 
    
Grade 0.014 0.029 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.012) 
Grade 3 -0.149** -0.094 -0.197*** 
 (0.072) (0.191) (0.055) 
Math 0.028 0.032 0.031 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.029) 
Female 0.057   
 (0.069)   
Number of prudent choices 0.082*** 0.105*** 0.063** 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
Low education -0.001 -0.120*** 0.076 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.078) 
High education 0.043 -0.051 0.112 
 (0.066) (0.087) (0.106) 
House owner -0.041 0.010 -0.060 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.061) 
Local Hukou address 0.011 0.108 -0.066 
 (0.058) (0.088) (0.095) 
Flipped booklet -0.048 0.033 -0.118*** 
 (0.029) (0.057) (0.042) 
    
Observations 223 109 114 
    
Specification tests    
(p-values F-test)    
    
Grade, Grade 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low education, high education, 
house owner, local Hukou 
0.000 0.038 0.474 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.6: Ordered logit regressions on the number of prudent choices (average marginal effects) – only 
including second primary school (follow-up sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Girls Boys 
    
Grade 0.020* 0.031 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.027) (0.005) 
Grade 3 0.067 -0.016 0.147*** 
 (0.077) (0.162) (0.032) 
Math 0.047** 0.068** 0.051 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.052) 
Female 0.072   
 (0.061)   
Number of prudent choices 0.086*** 0.122*** 0.072* 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.039) 
Low education 0.040 -0.020 0.103 
 (0.040) (0.075) (0.078) 
High education -0.013 -0.066 0.052 
 (0.076) (0.099) (0.095) 
House owner -0.017 -0.035 -0.041 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.074) 
Local Hukou address 0.093*** 0.129 0.071 
 (0.030) (0.128) (0.076) 
Flipped booklet -0.020 0.113** -0.157*** 
 (0.016) (0.054) (0.051) 
    
Observations 213 109 104 
    
Specification tests    
(p-values F-test)    
    
Grade, Grade 3 0.054 0.008 0.000 
Low education, high education, 
house owner, local Hukou 
0.000 0.756 0.538 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
